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1

Constitutions. In State v. Henning, the court held the statute
unconstitutional by a 4-3 decision. Finding no persuasive reason to do
otherwise, the court struck down the legislature’s attempt to eliminate the
requirement that law enforcement have “reasonable articulable
suspicion” to conduct an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.
This article provides a brief survey of similar laws in other states
that require offenders to visually inform the police and public that they
have been convicted of drunken driving or other crimes—a requirement
2
reminiscent of centuries-old “scarlet letter” sentencing. The article then
explains two constitutional issues key to the Henning decision: the
United States Supreme Court’s “reasonable articulable suspicion”
standard and its erosion, and the Minnesota Constitution’s strong
3
protections against “seizure.” Next, the article traces the history and
4
holding of the Henning case and focuses on the statutes involved.
Finally, the article critiques the Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority
opinion and dissent, noting that while the court has outlawed traffic stops
based solely on special “WX,” “WY,” or “WZ” license plates, police are
likely to receive the benefit of the doubt as long as they can provide any
5
reasonable reason for the stop.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. “Scarlet Letter” Sentencing and Efforts to Control Drunken
Driving
The death toll from drunken driving is an undeniable tragedy,
evidenced by data showing that more than one-third of traffic fatalities
6
can be blamed on alcohol-related crashes. Repeat drunken drivers are a
chief concern. Nearly half of Minnesota’s 30,000 driving-whileintoxicated (“DWI”) arrests each year involve drivers with prior DWI
7
convictions.
1. 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part V.
6. In 2002, 41% of the 42,815 U.S. traffic fatalities were attributed to crashes
involving alcohol. In Minnesota, the figure was 39%. See MADD Stats & Resources, at
http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1112,00.html (citing National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration data) (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
7. Jim Cleary, Controlling Repeat DWI Offenders with Staggered Sentencing,
Information Brief, Minnesota House of Representatives (January 2003), at 3, available at
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The Minnesota Legislature has tried many initiatives to reduce DWI
8
recidivism. So-called “staggered sentencing” was one response. The
state’s new “felony DWI” law, which took effect August 1, 2002, was
9
another. These efforts have had their moments in the public spotlight—
the felony DWI standard in particular. Against this high-profile
backdrop, for several decades a Minnesota statute has directed that the
license plates attached to cars registered to repeat drunken drivers be
impounded and “special series plates” be issued in their place so that law
10
enforcement can readily identify repeat offenders on the road.
Typically the plates begin with the letters “WX,” “WY,” or “WZ,” and
while only police are trained to look for the plates, anyone
knowledgeable about the law can learn to spot cars registered to people
likely convicted of drunken driving.
Minnesota is among a handful of states with such laws. Iowa, Ohio,
Oregon, and Washington have experimented with measures that alter the
11
license plates of repeat drunken drivers. Massachusetts has toyed with
requiring repeat offenders to display license plates reading “Twice
12
Convicted of Operating Under the Influence.” For several years Ohio
has required repeat drunken drivers to operate vehicles displaying license
13
plates of a different color and with special serial numbers. That state is
beefing up its law as of January 1, 2004, by requiring drivers who
operate vehicles with license plates from other states to display a special
14
decal on the bottom left corner of the vehicle’s back window.
While the license-plate laws are chiefly designed to catch police
officers’ attention, they also are reminiscent of “scarlet letter
sentencing,” a centuries-old idea of requiring repeat offenders to visually

http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/stagsent.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
8. Id. at 5 (explaining that staggered sentencing involves splitting up a defendant’s
sentence among several shorter terms).
9. MINN. STAT. § 169A.24 (2002).
10. MINN. STAT. § 168.041 (2002).
11. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle and License Plate
Sanctions, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/outreach/safesobr/19qp/factsheets/vehicle.
html (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
12. Ellen J. Silberman, Scarlet Letter Plates Sought for Drunken Drivers, BOSTON
HERALD, May 24, 2001, at 19.
13. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4503.231 (West 1999).
14. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4503.231(B)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003). The
change in Ohio, effective Jan. 1, 2004, also permits motorists with limited driving
privileges to operate an employer’s vehicle that lacks the special plates as long as the
employer knows about the employee’s past. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4503.231(B)(1)
(West 2003).
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15

inform others of their questionable past.
Scarlet letter sentencing
springs from legislative and judicial frustration with the failure of
16
traditional methods of sentencing. However, it also adds “shaming” to
the criminal law tenets of incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and
deterrence, or at least alters the retribution tenet in a sometimes
controversial and perhaps unconstitutional way.
The revival of shaming springs from profound and widespread
dissatisfaction with existing methods of punishment. In
particular, many people, including judges, doubt the
effectiveness and humanity of prison. Yet, the main alternative
to prison—parole—is equally unattractive, both because the
community fears the often unmonitored return of the offender
to its neighborhoods, and because most people believe
17
criminals should not go unpunished.
Scarlet letter sentencing results from legislative as well as judicial
18
innovations. Sometimes an individual judge’s creativity sets off wellpublicized tussles between branches of government or levels of the
judiciary. For example, in 1991 a New York judge required a driver with
six drunken-driving convictions to affix a fluorescent sign reading
19
“convicted DWI” on the license plate of any car he might drive. New
York’s highest court struck down the sentence because it was not
reasonably related to the driver’s rehabilitation and was deemed outside a
20
court’s authority. A commentator, meanwhile, urged that the appellate
court’s holding be construed narrowly so judicial creativity could be
21
maintained.
15. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).
Hawthorne’s masterpiece, set in Puritan New England, tells the story of Hester Prynne,
who bore an illegitimate child and was forced to wear an “A” for “adultery” on her
clothing.
The book, long in the public domain, is available online at
http://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Nathaniel_Hawthorne/The_Scarlet_Letter (last visited
Dec. 7, 2003).
16. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1880, 1882-84 (1991).
17. Id. at 1884-85.
18. Id. at 1882. For example, Nevada has allowed drunken drivers to bypass
incarceration if they perform community service while dressed in clothing that identifies
them as drunken drivers. In 1989, a Rhode Island judge required a defendant to place a
newspaper advertisement with his picture and words identifying himself as a child
molester.
19. People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995).
20. Id.
21. Dana Wordes, Recent Development, Penal Law Section 65.10: New York Court
of Appeals Holds That Probation Condition Requiring “CONVICTED DWI” Sign on
License Plate Was Penalty Not Reasonably Related to Probation, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
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Scarlet letter sentencing has its place, advocates say, because it
encourages repeat offenders to obey the law and also warns the public
22
that a repeat offender is nearby.
It has its detractors, as well. For
instance, an official from the Massachusetts American Civil Liberties
Union chapter described that state’s proposed DWI license-plate measure
23
as “sort of like the public pillory on Boston Common.”
B. History of the “Reasonable Articulable Suspicion” Standard
1.

The United States Supreme Court sets the “Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion” Standard

Apart from the collateral issues of shame and scarlet letter
sentencing is what legislators say is the chief goal of issuing special
license plates for cars registered to repeat drunken drivers: allowing
police officers to easily identify motorists with questionable pasts. When
police spot a motorist driving a vehicle with the special plates, they are
encouraged to keep careful watch—or, in Minnesota’s case, permit
officers to pull over the driver, regardless of whether the officer
suspected any wrongdoing was afoot and even though the driver may
never have been convicted of a crime.
When a motorist is stopped, that constitutes a “seizure,” which,
according to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
must be reasonable. Specifically, the Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
24
persons or things to be seized.
421, 433 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Barbara Clare Morton, Note, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and
into the Light—“Scarlet Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern
America Because It Deprives Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 100-01
(arguing that violating a repeat offender’s privacy “can successfully rehabilitate and deter
some offenders and would-be criminals”). See also Road Warrior, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Sept. 18, 2002, at B5 (including a letter from a newspaper
reader suggesting that Virginia replicate Minnesota’s law requiring repeat DWI offenders
to display special license plates. The reader wrote: “If nothing else, it would warn us to
be extra vigilant when we encounter a car with such a plate.”).
23. Silberman, supra note 12.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Until 1968, when the United States Supreme Court decided Terry v.
25
Ohio, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s probable
cause provision literally, holding that for a seizure to be lawful, probable
26
cause had to be present.
In Terry, however, the Court distinguished
between an arrest and an investigatory stop, holding that the latter
required only a reasonable articulable suspicion rather than probable
cause.
In Terry, an experienced officer was on routine patrol when he
27
spotted two individuals standing on a street corner.
The officer
observed these men taking turns pacing in front of and peering through a
28
store window five or six times each. Based on his prior experience in
this particular neighborhood, the officer determined that this activity was
29
typical of “casing a job” for robbery. The officer then approached the
men, identified himself as a police officer and performed a “pat down” of
the men’s outer clothing. During this limited pat down, the officer
30
31
discovered guns in the men’s pockets.
The men were arrested.
During their case, the men sought to have the guns suppressed, arguing
that this search and seizure was unreasonable because it was not based on
32
probable cause.
In determining whether the seizure and search was reasonable, the
Terry Court engaged in a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the officer’s
actions were justified, and (2) whether these actions were reasonably
33
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference.
The Court focused on balancing the government’s need to search or seize
34
against the invasion of the individual.
In order to justify such an
intrusion, the Court held that the officer would need to point to “specific
35
and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”
Requiring the officer to point to these specific facts allows a judge to
objectively look at the facts to determine reasonability and lawfulness.
The Court further examined the government’s interest in keeping
officers and the public safe. The Court reasoned that an arrest is “wholly
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-57 (1967).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
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different” from a limited search where an “officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . [he may]
36
conduct a carefully limited search . . . .”
The standard announced in
Terry later became known as the “reasonable articulable suspicion”
standard.
Gradually, the Supreme Court began to use the “reasonable
articulable suspicion” standard in analyzing situations other than limited
pat down searches of a person. For example, the Court used this
37
standard in analyzing motor vehicles stops. Eventually, the Court went
even further, holding that under some circumstances, the government
need not even have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a motor
38
vehicle.
These decisions balanced the government’s interest in stopping
39
criminal activity against the privacy rights of a citizen. For example, in
40
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court addressed
whether law enforcement may use roadblocks to stop and investigate all
drivers in order to arrest those who are impaired by alcohol. By stopping
every motorist who reached a roadblock, law enforcement could not state
a reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. The Court’s opinion
explained that a “seizure” occurs under the Fourth Amendment when a
41
vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. In determining that the seizure was
reasonable under the facts of the case, the Court held that “the balance of
the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of
intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in
42
favor of the state program.”
2. The Minnesota Constitution affords more protection than the
United States Constitution: State v. Ascher
The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken an approach different from
36. Id. at 30.
37. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
38. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border patrol’s
routine of stopping vehicles at checkpoints located on major highway to check for illegal
aliens absent reasonable articulable suspicion did not violate Fourth Amendment).
39. See id. at 560.
40. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
41. Id. at 450.
42. Id. at 455.
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the United States Supreme Court in analyzing its citizens’ Fourth
Amendment rights while in motor vehicles. In Ascher v. Commissioner
43
of Public Safety, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the
Minnesota Constitution more broadly than the federal Constitution.
Ascher involved a state and local sobriety roadblock. The
Burnsville Police Department, along with the Minnesota State Patrol, set
up a roadblock stopping all vehicles in an attempt to catch alcohol44
impaired drivers. The officers briefly detained each driver and directed
45
those believed to be under the influence to a “final screen” area. The
State Patrol notified the media of the roadblock, and news crews set up
46
After being directed to this area,
cameras in the final screen area.
Ricky Ascher, a driver, was required to undergo field sobriety tests and
47
take a preliminary breath test. Ascher was subsequently arrested and
48
charged with refusal to submit to chemical testing. In total, only 2.3%
of those stopped at the roadblock were arrested for some type of
49
offense.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that when law enforcement uses
roadblocks to stop drivers to investigate and arrest those who are
impaired by alcohol, the police violate Article I, Section 10 of the
50
Minnesota State Constitution. The court explained that the Minnesota
Constitution requires police to have an objective individualized
51
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop a driver.
The court
further held that the state had not proven there was any reason to
dispense with this rule. In the interest of protecting the public from
52
intrusive procedures, the court held the statute unconstitutional.
Suspicionless stops surfaced again a year later in the Minnesota
53
Court of Appeals. In State v. Greyeagle, the appeals court addressed
whether a police officer could stop a vehicle based solely on the fact that
the vehicle bore special series license plates issued to those with repeated
driving violations, including drunken driving. In that case, a state
trooper stopped a motorist based on the trooper’s routine practice of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994).
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id.
541 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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54

stopping all vehicles with such special registration license plates.
These plates were made available to “drivers or owners of cars whose
55
regular plates have been impounded because of driving violations.” A
person could obtain the special plates if he or she showed that there was
another licensed driver who was still legally entitled to drive the
56
vehicle.
The court of appeals held that the police may not make
suspicionless stops of drivers based solely on special series registration
plates, where the statute creating such plates does not provide that the
57
plates are issued under a condition of having to be routinely stopped.
The court also determined that where the state produced no evidence that
suspicionless stops are any more effective than the traditional stops based
on particular suspicion, the routine stop of special series registration
58
vehicles is unconstitutional.
59
In apparent response to Greyeagle,
the Legislature passed
Minnesota Statutes section 168.0422, which permitted police to pull over
drivers displaying special series plates “for the purpose of determining
whether the driver is operating the vehicle lawfully under a valid driver’s
60
license.”
In State v. Baumann, a 2000 case involving section 168.0422, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a traffic stop of a motorist bearing
61
the plates, but did so without reaching the constitutional issues.
However, a sharply worded concurrence from Judge Randall,
reminiscent of criticisms involving scarlet letter sentencing, urged that
the underlying statute’s constitutionality must be considered:
Minn. Stat. § 168.0422 is a statute authorizing a “mark” or
“brand” to be placed on a citizen’s vehicle license plate. That
mark labels that vehicle’s driver as one who can be stopped,
not for articulable suspicion of criminal activities, but rather
because of the “mark.” That is impermissible . . . . You might
as well make the mark a pink triangle or some other identifying
62
object. The results are exactly the same.
54. Id. at 327.
55. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 168.041, subd. 6; 168.042, subd. 12 (1994)).
56. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d at 327.
57. Id. at 328, 330.
58. Id. at 329.
59. State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Minn. 2003).
60. MINN. STAT. § 168.0422 (2002).
61. State v. Baumann, 616 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (review denied
Minn. Nov. 15, 2000).
62. Id. at 778.
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Finally, in 2003, the constitutionality of traffic stops based solely on
Minnesota Statutes section 168.0422 was decided in State v. Henning.
III. STATE V. HENNING
A. The Facts, Statutes, and Initial Appeal
Joel Henning, the driver in State v. Henning, received special series
“WZ” license plates after his vehicles were impounded because of two
63
previous “driving while impaired” convictions. Pursuant to Minnesota
law, Henning’s father requested special series plates after demonstrating
to the court that he was the owner of the vehicle and had a valid driver’s
64
license. Specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 168.041, subdivision
6, allows special series license plates to be issued:
If a member of the violator’s household has a valid driver’s
license, the violator or owner has a limited license issued under
section 171.30, or the owner is not the violator and the owner
has a valid or limited license or a member of the owner’s
65
household has a valid driver’s license.
On July 12, 2000, an Olmsted County deputy noticed Henning’s
66
vehicle bearing the “WZ” plates. The deputy followed the vehicle but
did not notice any inappropriate driving conduct or any driving
67
68
violations. The deputy stopped the vehicle, later testifying that the
only reason he stopped Henning’s vehicle was because the vehicle
69
displayed special series plates.
Joel Henning told the deputy he knew he could be stopped based on
the special series license plates, but he also expressed belief that the
70
deputy needed an additional reason to stop him. Henning had no valid
driver’s license at the time of the stop because his license had been
71
revoked. The deputy cited Henning for driving after revocation, having
72
no driver’s license in his possession, and having no proof of insurance.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 381-82.
Id. at 387 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Henning challenged the stop at an omnibus hearing in Olmsted
73
Henning argued that section 168.0422 of the
County District Court.
74
Minnesota Statutes was unconstitutional.
At the hearing, the deputy
admitted that the special series license plates were the only reason he
75
stopped the vehicle. The district court held the statute unconstitutional
but found that special series license plates gave the deputy “reasonable
76
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop.”
Henning was convicted of driving after revocation and driving without a
77
valid driver’s license in his possession.
Henning appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which
78
The
affirmed the convictions and held the statute constitutional.
appeals court held that Henning implicitly submitted to routine police
79
stops by applying for and displaying special series license plates. The
court explained that “[b]y applying for and displaying those plates,
appellant submitted to routine police stops of his vehicle; he told the
80
deputy that he knew he could be stopped because of the plates.” The
court noted that even if Henning had not known, he would be deemed to
81
have submitted since citizens are presumed to know the law.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals analogized Henning’s situation to
that in which a driver consents to tests for purposes of determining the
presence of alcohol, controlled substance, or hazardous substances
82
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 169.123, subdivision 2(a). The
court of appeals explained that:
If operating motor vehicles within the state legally implies a
driver’s consent to blood, breath, or urine testing for a
particular purpose, it is reasonable to infer that utilization of
special series license plates likewise may legally imply the
driver’s consent to stops of the vehicle for a particular
83
purpose.
However, the testing conducted to determine whether a driver is
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 2003).
State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 504
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502 n.1.
Id. at 502.
Id.
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impaired takes place only after an officer already has a reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and probable cause to arrest the
suspect. In such a case, an officer would have specific justification for
believing that the driver was impaired. An officer cannot simply pull
over a driver and require the person to submit to a test.
Henning petitioned to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari.
B.

In the Minnesota Supreme Court

The Minnesota Supreme Court held section 168.0422
unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States
84
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
85
Pursuant to Delaware v. Prouse, stopping a motor vehicle to
check whether the driver is properly licensed is a seizure and is not
permitted under the Fourth Amendment without reasonable articulable
86
suspicion.
However, the state argued that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy because Henning applied for and received the
special series license plates, and that by doing so he was aware that his
use of the vehicle gave police authority to stop vehicles with such license
87
plates without reasonable articulable suspicion. The Minnesota Court
of Appeals relied on that argument in upholding the statute’s
constitutionality; however, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this
88
analysis.
As the court explained, the facts did not establish that Henning had
a subjective belief that he could be pulled over solely because of the
89
special license plates.
More importantly, because the state
contemplated that Henning’s father might apply for and receive the
special license plates, the state knew that someone other than Henning—
someone with a valid driver’s license—might be driving the vehicle. To
obtain the special plates, one must show that the person who will be
driving the vehicle will be doing so legally. That driver might be a
violator with a temporary license, or it might be someone never
convicted of a crime. As the supreme court correctly pointed out,
“[t]hus, Minn. Stat. § 168.0422 subjects a number of licensed motorists,
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 2003).
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 383.
Id. at 383-84.
State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 2003).
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who were not a party to the original revocation of the registration plates
or the subsequent reissuing of the special series plates, to the possibility
90
of being stopped by every law enforcement officer they encounter.”
The court subsequently discredited the state’s assertion that Henning had
no reasonable expectation of privacy and that this “fact” justified a
91
suspicionless stop.
The court then examined whether Henning’s stop was reasonable.
If there was no reasonable articulable suspicion, the state must provide a
persuasive reason for dispensing with the general requirement of
92
individualized suspicion. Citing Prouse, the Minnesota Supreme Court
explained, “[w]here individualized suspicion is not required to make a
stop, other safeguards are relied upon to assure that a driver’s reasonable
expectation of privacy may not be invaded at the discretion of a
93
patrolling officer.”
The court further explained, “[t]he degree of the
intrusion must be weighed against the promotion of legitimate
94
government interests.” The court noted that legal drivers with special
series license plates would be subject to repeated stops at the unchecked
95
discretion of law enforcement. The court concluded that the state had
not met its burden of articulating its persuasive reason for dispensing
96
with the general requirement of individualized suspicion.
Justice Meyer wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Chief Justice Blatz and Justice Hanson. The dissent based its opinion on
balancing competing interests: (1) the gravity of the public concern
served by the seizure, (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and (3) the severity of the interference with individual
97
liberty. The dissent pointed out that with respect to the first factor, the
98
state has a substantial interest in keeping roads safe. With respect to
the second factor, the dissent noted that “[v]iolators whose license plates
90. Id.
91. Id. The court discredited the district court’s ruling that there existed reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Applying a totality of the circumstances
analysis, the court correctly pointed out that the special series license plates are issued
only when it is shown that the vehicle may be legally driven. Thus, the mere presence of
such plates could not constitute reasonable articulable suspicion. Id. at 384-85.
92. Id. at 385 (quoting Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186
(Minn. 1994)).
93. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
94. Id. at 384 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).
95. Id. at 385.
96. Id. at 386.
97. Id. at 387 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 388.
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were impounded by the arresting officer showed a 50 percent decrease in
99
recidivism over a 2-year period . . . .” With regard to the third factor,
the dissent claimed that the stops involve a narrow class of persons and
100
that these stops would be limited and brief.
In responding to these points, the majority agreed that the state has a
101
legitimate interest in keeping drunken drivers off the road.
As the
court pointed out, however, “[t]he state has not met its burden of
showing that it is impracticable for police to develop individualized
suspicion and that a departure from the individualized suspicion
requirement will significantly help police achieve a higher rate of arrest
than would using more conventional means of apprehending alcohol
102
impaired drivers.”
Although the practice of impounding license plates
may further the state’s interest in protecting the public, the court
explained, the subsequent issuance of special plates to allow the vehicle
to be driven by a legal driver does not necessarily further the state’s
103
interests in protecting the public.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s firm position that suspicionless
stops of motorists are improper can be cast in terms heard frequently at
the United States Supreme Court during Chief Justice Earl Warren’s
reign: the ends do not justify the means.
Clearly the Ascher and Henning decisions put the burden squarely
on Minnesota law enforcement to show that there is a legitimate and
specific reason to stop a motor vehicle. While the public interest in
curbing drunken drivers in general, and repeat offenders in particular, is
a vital public interest and a vexing problem, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has unequivocally mandated that motorists must be observed doing
something wrong before a traffic stop may commence.
The Henning decision stands apart from recent decisions in
neighboring jurisdictions that involved questionable traffic stops
involving license plates. In Iowa this year, a police officer’s mistaken
stop was forgiven after he initially thought a driver was operating a
vehicle lacking a rear license plate but then saw the temporary paper card
99.
100.
101.
102.
1994)).
103.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. (citing Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn.
Id.
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in the rear window and completed the stop nonetheless.
The Iowa
Court of Appeals reasoned that even though the officer was mistaken,
“there arose no requirement that the officer act like he had never seen
105
[the driver].”
The Seventh Circuit, meanwhile, said a western
Wisconsin trooper acted properly after pulling over a van not displaying
a rear license plate, even though a temporary registration was affixed to
the rear window and the officer, peering through the tinted window,
106
could observe “a square cardboard with letters on it.”
Although Henning sets a stringent standard for law enforcement, it
is likely that courts will scrutinize traffic stops of vehicles bearing
special series plates closely on a case-by-case basis and may defer to
police whenever possible. For example, in State v. Baumann, a 2000
case in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the stop of a
vehicle bearing “WX” plates without reaching the constitutional issue,
107
the police officer received the benefit of the doubt.
The officer had
overheard police-radio chatter early in his shift about a white Chevrolet
Corsica whose driver was wanted on warrants and whose driving
108
privileges had been canceled.
Although the Chevrolet’s license plate
number was included in the radio transmission, the officer did not recall
the license plate number or the driver’s gender when he pulled over
109
Robert Baumann’s white Chevrolet Corsica.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals upheld the traffic stop and rejected
110
The court ruled that the stop was
Baumann’s constitutional challenge.
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion because the stop was not
111
based solely on Baumann’s “WX” plates.
As Judge Harten reasoned,
“[a]lthough the officer may not have been certain that the vehicle he
stopped was the same vehicle seen earlier in the evening, this was a
reasonable inference. The vehicle descriptions were identical, and the
stopped vehicle was first observed only a mile from the reported earlier
112
sighting.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently refused to
reconsider the Baumann case.

104.
2003).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

State v. Ross, No. 01-1840, 2003 WL 118334, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan 15,
Id. at *2.
United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286, 288 (7th Cir. 1996).
State v. Baumann, 616 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 774.
Id.
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While Henning and Ascher taken together require police officers
making a traffic stop to provide some rationale besides special series
plates, Henning and Baumann taken together suggest that Minnesota
appellate courts are likely to give police substantial latitude as long as
they can provide some reasonable articulable suspicion for the traffic
stop.
This means that Minnesota drivers and their defense attorneys must
push police to provide bases for all traffic stops involving special series
license plates. When the state fails to meet that burden, charges
stemming from traffic stops based solely on “WX,” “WY,” or “WZ”
plates must be dismissed. However, once police provide grounds for the
stop, courts are likely to defer to officers’ judgment as long as the
grounds are at all reasonable. That seems to shift the burden back to the
defendant exhibiting the special plates, who is faced with proving the
unreasonableness of a stop based on an improper lane change, a failure to
yield, or one of a plethora of minor driving infractions that sober as well
as drunken drivers do constantly.
V. CONCLUSION
In State v. Henning, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a firm
stance in favor of the “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard. The
court made it clear that constitutional rules apply even during stops of
vehicles with special series license plates, which are issued chiefly to
repeat drunken drivers. However, when Henning is viewed in light of
other recent Minnesota appellate cases, it seems clear that courts are
poised to give police the benefit of the doubt as long as the officers can
provide some reasonable reason for stopping a vehicle besides the
presence of the special plates.
In theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court has reached a workable
balance between targeting repeated drunken drivers and ensuring
citizens’ constitutional rights. Now, the challenge will be in ensuring
that theory translates into practice, lest those special license-plate letters
“WX,” “WY,” and “WZ” take on an uncomfortable, and perhaps
unconstitutional, scarlet tinge.
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